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Abstract 
Purpose – The paper examines the main regulatory frameworks of the 
telecommunications industry through the concept of market failure and analyses how and 
why the policy often leads to undesirable outcomes that might be considered as 
regulatory failure. 
Methodology/approach/design – The research uses the EU regulatory framework for 
electronic communications as a base for the analysis of the main policy objectives 
through the prism of the market failure theory with an eye to the interests of the main 
market players in the telecommunications markets. 
Findings – About any aspect of regulation allows to find ways to create opportunities for 
some groups of the industry and stifle activity of others. Despite the theory of market 
failure provides reasonable justifications for regulation of telecommunications markets, it 
is possible to argue that many of these problems are mainly the consequence of the policy 
and could be better solved by market mechanisms. 
Originality/value – The results of the research allow to look at the problems of 
telecommunications development and issues of the high level of concentration of the 
telecommunications markets as regulatory formed problems rather than consequences of 
the inherited industry’s characteristics.  
 
Keywords: Liberalization, Market failure, Regulatory failure, Telecommunications, 
Competition. 
 
1. Introduction 
Debates about the role of government in economy are very old. It has 
been incorporated in the mainstream of economics that market mechanisms 
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sometimes lead to undesirable situations, so-called, “market failure”, and, 
therefore, there are needs to interfere in the market in order to mitigate the 
problem. These interventions also can have a negative impact on the economy, 
and, such consequences can be considered as government or regulatory failure.1 
The imperfection of the market seems as an apparent justification for the 
attempts to regulate the economic activity of human beings, but, at the same 
time, those groups of people who have a real access to the formation and 
exploitation of regulatory mechanisms have an enormous temptation and 
tremendous opportunities to use a legal system for their own benefits. Therefore, 
it is of a paramount significance to understand how regulation can be used for 
the interests of such interest groups and to expose the relationship between 
regulatory frameworks, that should be aimed to remedy market failure, with 
interests of those who create them or can have access to their formation. 
Interesting examples where regulation provides wide opportunities for 
policymakers to enrich some powerful groups at the expense of society can be 
found in industries that heavily depend on innovations and play a significant role 
in modern society. The regulatory failures in these fields affect the public 
welfare, contribute to the growth of inequality and undermine incentives for 
innovations in the fields of the new economy. From this point of view, the 
telecommunications industry is an attractive area for such analysis, and, 
furthermore, the concentration of power in this industry allows to assume that 
this situation can be a result of the government activity in this area. 
The article begins with a brief review of theoretical approaches to 
determination of market and government failures. The subsequent parts are 
devoted to the transformation of the landscape of telecommunications over the 
last decades and to the analysis of key issues of regulatory policy in the field. 
The main emphasis is made on the reasons for the government interventions in 
the telecommunications market from the positions of theories of market failure, 
and, at the same time, provides basic assumptions how and why these 
interventions lead to the policy failings and express in the oligopolistic structure 
of the industry. 
2. The theoretical approaches to determination of market and government 
failures 
In economics, the conception of “government failure” is another side of 
the coin of “market failure”. Despite the idea of the supporters of the invisible 
                                                 
1The term “regulatory failure” can be often met in academic literature with the same 
interpretation as government failure, but it can also mean the failing to achieve certain 
regulatory goals regardless of the economic aspects (see, e.g., Baldwin et al., 2012). 
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hand that market mechanisms lead society to the increase of welfare for 
everyone, there is a widely accepted assumption that the market in a number of 
cases fails to achieve this goal and, thus, that there are needs for government 
intervention. 
There are different views and understandings of what constitutes market 
failure, but the main reasons for government intervention are concentrated 
within the theoretical framework described by Joseph Stiglitz in the “Economics 
of the public sector” (Stiglitz, 1988): competition failure, necessity to produce 
public goods, presence of externalities, incomplete markets, imperfect 
information (or information asymmetry), unemployment and periodical 
instability, unequal distribution of incomes, “bad” consumers’ decisions. 
According to his opinion the first six of these reasons directly relate to the 
problem of market failure and the latter two can be justified, even if market 
mechanisms work perfectly in economic terms, by the principles of justice, 
humanism and paternalism. 
Meanwhile, it is also generally recognized that the problem of “market 
failure is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for governmental 
intervention” (Mazzucato & Penna, 2016). Not only the market, but also 
regulatory bodies consist of self-interested agents and, as a result, decisions of 
policymakers, officials and bureaucrats can lead to the same or even worse 
outcomes than the activity of imperfect market mechanisms. Anyone who tries 
to participate in the creation of rules cannot be free from his personal interests, 
beliefs or biases. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) point out that the necessity of 
government intervention often requires the choice between market failure and 
corruption, because the latter is the result of any intervention in the market since 
any intervention redistributes resources, and they conclude that corruption is 
merely “unavoidable price to dealing with market failure”. “Corrupt incentives 
are the nearly inevitable consequences of all government attempts to control 
market forces” (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), and, that is why, some pundits even 
claim that they would prefer to live in the presence of market failure, rather than 
to have a risk of “widespread government failures” (Mills, 1986). 
George Stigler (1971) in his “Theory of Economic Regulation” argued 
that the state “is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society”, 
and, therefore, the main players of the industry are tempted to capture this 
resource in order to maintain their positions. The appearance and development 
of public choice theory has allowed to look deeper at the problems of regulatory 
capture, and challenged the assumptions about the public interest nature of 
regulation (e.g. Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Holcombe, 2015). However, the 
regulatory capture is not the only factor that leads to the failure of regulation. 
There are numerous institutional aspects and there are also insufficient resources 
and epistemological limitations (Baldwin et al., 2012). We do not have 
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knowledge about the future, we are not always able to assess the probability of 
certain events, and have to make our judgements under uncertainty relying on 
heuristics and biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), but, nevertheless, even such 
limitations can be used by those who have a political power in their own 
benefits. 
Of course, it is not always clear, what more tilts regulation toward 
suppression of innovations and concentration of market power: regulatory 
capture or other regulatory failings, but understanding of the relationship 
between regulatory frameworks and interests of the main industry players is able 
to expose the roots of the problem. 
3. Transformation of the landscape of the telecommunications industry 
One of the main ideas of the “theory of economic regulation” (Stigler, 
1971) is that regulation is used by private entities in order to hamper 
competition. It is even possible to find claims that the aim to suppress 
competition was among the main objectives in the regulatory policy of the US in 
the 1930s (Dempsey, 1989). These objectives were supported by the economic 
justifications for such decision making. For example, one of the rationales for 
legal suppression of competition in the industries that heavily depend on 
infrastructure, such as transportation or telecommunications, was based on the 
assumption that the immaterial nature of the products of such industries does not 
create incentives to invest in the expensive infrastructure without possibilities to 
obtain economic rent that could be provided by a monopoly position (Dempsey, 
1989).  
According to one of the explanations that justify the creation of entry 
barriers: “ ‘good regulation’ is supposed to constrain entry so that the economies 
of single firm production can be achieved” (Joskow & Rose, 1987). It is not a 
rare view in economics that monopolistic markets are able to provide more 
benefits to society rather than competition. Some even claim that “in an 
economic paradise, where a regulator is omniscient, benevolent, and able to 
fulfill any promise he makes, competition cannot improve upon regulated 
monopoly” (Armstrong & Sappington, 2006). Such justifications perfectly 
supported monopolistic structure of telecommunications when this industry was 
entirely in the hands of the state. Indeed, before the end of the 1980s in most of 
the countries, regardless of capitalistic or socialistic character of their economy, 
telecommunications were under the full control of the governments as state-
owned companies. 
The most remarkable exception from the state-owned monopoly model 
was the telecommunications industry of the United States, where the major 
player was private company AT&T. Strictly speaking, AT&T was not the only 
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company that provided telecommunications services in the US. There were also, 
so-called, independent telephone companies, but on most of the territory of the 
country AT&T was able to establish a monopoly and became one of the biggest 
corporations in American history. AT&T was a vertically integrated company 
that provided the full range of telecommunications services and produced 
telecommunications equipment for the industry. In 1974, the United States 
Department of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against the company, and the 
consequence of this action was the consent decree about divestiture of AT&T in 
1982. As a result, in 1984 the local operations of AT&T were split into seven 
independent regional companies (Regional Bell Operating Companies also 
known as “Baby Bells”), while long distance business, as well as a production of 
telecommunications equipment, remained at that time under the control of 
AT&T. 
The process of creation of the competitive market in the EU started in 
1987, when the Commission of the European Communities presented the Green 
Paper on the Development of Common Market for Telecommunications 
Services and Equipment. Despite the claim of this document about promoting 
“the development of new services by setting them in a more competitive 
framework” and necessity of “the transition toward a more competitive 
environment”, the Green Paper also explicitly contained notification about “the 
major importance of scale effect” in this vital area of the modern economy. 
However, the scale effect is precisely one of those industrial characteristics that 
tilt industries toward high concentration, and, thus, the statement about its 
importance for the development of the industry quite contradicts with the claims 
about promotion of rivalry, if only we are not talking about the creation of 
oligopolistic market. Therefore, it seems plausible that the goal was the 
substitution of the state-owned monopolies across the Europe by the market 
where only several supranational giants will play the main role on the whole 
territory, rather than promoting the places under the sun for small and medium-
sized businesses in this field. The current situation in the European market 
speaks in favor of this claim: the big companies from the advanced European 
economies have managed to take control over the industry in many less 
developed parts of the continent2, but it does not mean that small European 
countries were unable to develop the industry without such aid. The recent 
studies show that some Central and Eastern European countries not only 
                                                 
2Some scholars notice that “[t]he internationalization of EU incumbents could not have 
taken place without liberalization of entry regulation and would have been difficult with-
out progress on unbundling and privatization” and that “the most international of the 
EU’s Multinational telecoms … incumbents emerged from the larger continental econo-
mies: France, Germany, Spain and Italy” (Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes & Revuelta, 2010). 
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demonstrated the higher level of competition and the presence of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in the industry during the first decade of the XXI 
century, but also have been able to leapfrog the most advanced economies of the 
EU in the development of fiber-optic infrastructure (Lemstra & Melody, 2014; 
Serdarević et al, 2016; Rood, 2010). 
Some scholars point out that the global process of liberalization was 
pushed by the US government in the interests of the US economy (Mueller, 
2010), and some facts support this claim. The state-owned monopolies until the 
end of 1980s controlled not only telecommunications infrastructure and market 
of telecom services, but also the market of terminal equipment that could be 
connected to their networks, and the European decision about “liberalization” of 
telecommunications coincided with the changes in the structure of the global 
ICT equipment market. The first Directive of the reform in 1988 aimed to create 
a common market of end-user terminals (Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 
16 May 1988). In the middle of 1980s the former American telecom monopolist 
AT&T launched an active campaign in the field of telecom equipment 
production in Europe: the company formed joint ventures with Philips 
Telecommunications B.V. in the Netherlands and with Telefonica in Spain 
(Noam, 1992), and acquired 25% share of Italian Olivetti S.p.A.. In 1989, Italian 
state-owned telecom manufacturer Italtel chose AT&T as a partner for its plans 
to upgrade Italian network with estimated budget of $30 billion (Hochheiser, 
1990). The agreement between AT&T and Italtel also called for joint 
development of new products, and, according to some opinions, provided AT&T 
the basis to be a major player in the future European telecom market 
(Hochheiser, 1990). 
This shift of the regulatory policy of telecommunications allows to 
suppose that whether the whole preceding period of regulation in this field was 
based on fragile theories or the current approach is not the best from the point of 
view of the public interest. Moreover, we can also suggest that regardless of a 
dominant theory at any particular period these theoretical propositions can be 
used by those who have power to implement them in the public policy or, 
furthermore, even such dominance of a point of view in economics can be a 
result of interests of policymakers. 
Of course, it could be argued that this change was warranted by the 
technological breakthrough in the ICT industry, but such explanation does not 
provide a comprehensive answer to the question about the main beneficiaries of 
the policy, especially, if we look how the problem of the shortage of supply of 
ordinary phone services has been solved after the implementation of market 
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mechanisms in different parts of the world3. Moreover, even economic theories 
supported the claim about subadditivity of fixed phone services, that provided a 
scientific basis for the natural monopoly structure of the area, were constantly 
challenged by the empirical evidences (Spulber & Yoo, 2013). At the same time, 
the processes of “deregulation” and “privatization” in telecommunications also 
do not prove the presence of the “public interest based” approach in the 
regulatory policy. A captured regulation can easily take a form of 
“liberalization” and maintain the interests of powerful groups of society. Despite 
the fact that European reform of the industry could be considered as a proper 
way toward the creation of a competitive market in this field, it cannot exclude 
the supposition that in reality the interests of a big business did play an 
important role in the implemented policy. 
4. Key issues of the telecommunications policy 
It is generally assumed that the process of demonopolization of 
telecommunications in Europe can be considered as a period of “deregulation” 
and “liberalization” of the industry (Koenig et al., 2002), but this terminology 
can be quite misleading. Indeed, the state has not retreated from the 
telecommunications industry and has continued to play a significant role in the 
field, however, it “has taken on a host of new functions ... in the new 
institutional arrangements” (Grande, 1994). No doubt that during this period 
there were some efforts toward the creation of rivalry in the market, even if in an 
oligopolistic form, and there was a real transformation of property rights from 
the states to private entities, but there was also creation of new institutional 
environment that imposed new regulatory burdens on the new participants of the 
telecom business. 
According to the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications there are three main objectives of regulation in this field: 
strengthening of competition, stimulation of investment, fostering of consumers’ 
freedom of choice and “enable them to benefit from innovative services, quality 
and lower rates”4. From the European Directives aimed to achieve these goals 
we can distinguish several key aspects, that try to solve the problems that, 
allegedly, cannot be solved by market mechanisms: (1) the strategic planning 
                                                 
3E.g., Armstrong & Sappington (2006) analyze the development of the industry in Chile 
and shows that that “liberalization” allowed to increase the number of fixed lines more 
than three times between 1992 and 2000. The similar picture can be found, for example, 
in Russian telecommunications. 
4 Summaries of EU legislation: Regulatory framework for electronic communications 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:l24216a). 
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and distribution of limited resources such as radio spectrum, (2) access to 
network elements and associated facilities, (3) the necessity of integrity and 
security of networks and services, (4) the harmonization of networks, associated 
facilities and services through standardization, (5) control over companies that 
have significant market power and (6) the social significance of 
telecommunications services. 
These aspects are universal issues in telecommunications industry not 
only in the EU, but also in other parts of the world, where current economic 
conditions are sufficient for the development of this area. The analysis below 
provides the view on these aspects through the prisms of the theories of market 
and government failures. 
4.1. The strategic planning and distribution of limited resources such as 
radio spectrum 
The theory of market failure justifies the government activity in this area 
through the problem of externalities, because according to the basic assumption 
unregulated use of radio frequencies will make impossible the efficient 
utilization of the spectrum due to the problem of interference. The “doctrine of 
spectrum scarcity” prevailed in the regulatory policy of telecommunications 
during the XX century and still plays the main role in the issues devoted to the 
planning and distribution of radio frequencies. In 1959, Ronald Coase 
introduced the idea of tradability of radio spectrum (Coase 1959), and since the 
last decades of the XX century various countries have gradually adopted these 
principles in their regulatory frameworks.  
While the Coasean approach of the distribution of radio spectrum 
expands to new geographic territories like European Union5, it is very important 
to notice that nowadays the development of radio technologies allows to make 
claims that the scarcity of radio spectrum is a common misconception (e.g. 
Staple & Werbach, 2004), or that “new technologies promise to replace scarcity 
with abundance, dumb terminals with smart radios able to adapt to their 
surroundings, and government-defined licenses with flexible sharing of the 
airwaves” (Werbach, 2004). From such point of view the efficiency of radio 
spectrum utilization can be achieved through the reuse of the frequencies, 
implementation of “smart” antennas, advanced methods of modulation and other 
technological improvements. The radio spectrum by its nature is a common 
resource and, thus, the creation of the exclusive rights on the usage of this 
common good reduces diversity of available technologies, contributes to the 
                                                 
5See Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
March 2012. 
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market concentration (Trubnikov, 2017) and reasonably induces concerns from 
society. Lawrence Lessig (2007) compares the distribution of radio spectrum 
through auctions with the distribution of the “right to sell hotdog”, and that 
introduces the problem in a very straightforward manner. 
In general, the solution of the problem of distribution of radio spectrum is 
placed between two extremes. One of them is the propertization of radio 
frequencies, and, despite the common relationship between the market and 
property, it hardly can be considered as “liberalization”, because it just 
transforms the common property into the hands of private entities. In this case 
the link between the high market concentration and the market imperfection is 
just an illusion caused by the fact that market mechanisms play some role after 
the privatization of the common resource, but since the establishment of such 
rules is the result of government intervention into the realm of commons and the 
artificial limitation of the resource that hypothetically is not so scarce, it could 
be argued that the competition failure is rather the government failure than the 
market inability to resolve the issue. Moreover, since market mechanisms play 
such secondary role in the process of frequencies allocation we cannot claim that 
this concentration is the result of the victory in the market competition merely 
because such competition has not been possible. This market was doomed by the 
state to be an oligopoly even before it was created.6 However, this approach can 
be considered, to some extent, as “deregulation”, because after the assignment of 
property rights, the allocation of resources toward the highest valued use could 
be under the market mechanisms.  
The alternative is a real liberalization of radio spectrum, and the role of 
government in such a case is to manage availability of this resource to everyone 
and prevent interference and fraud. This approach is, possibly, more difficult in 
implementation. It requires thorough and comprehensive analysis of the existing 
technologies, monitoring of their development, creation of regulatory policy and 
enforcement of these rules. It is even possible that future technologies will allow 
us to completely open the spectrum and manage its distribution without any 
direct intervention of government, but, then, this future openness should be a 
purpose of the current regulatory efforts. The role of government in such 
conditions would be still very important, because the regulation must provide 
the solution for other related issues such as, for example, ecological problems 
caused by the usage of radio technologies in order to protect citizens from the 
abuse of electromagnetic waves by the market players, or, as Lessig suggests, 
                                                 
6Melody (2012), e.g., notes that in the EU “[t]he liberalisation objective of stimulating 
competition and opening access apparently was not considered to be the cornerstone of 
spectrum policy”.  
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the government could “simply be assuring that the technologies that use the 
spectrum are properly certified technologies” (Lessig, 2001). 
4.2. Access to network elements and associated facilities 
This aspect includes two parts, and both of them can be explained by the 
competition failure of the market. European regulation, for example, imposes an 
obligation to share facilities and network elements of the operators that have 
significant market power (Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 7 March 2002). The first part is devoted to the necessity of 
interconnection of different networks, and in this case, incumbents can easily 
prevent potential competitors from the entry to the market. Therefore, the 
importance of the regulation of this issue has significant value for the promotion 
of rivalry in the industry. Meanwhile, the second part is not so obvious and can 
be challenged by some suppositions. 
It is necessary to bear in mind that the initial efforts to solve the problem 
of telecom monopolies by no means had relation to the realm of market failure. 
These monopolies in European countries were state-owned companies and they 
had to be privatized according to the new regulatory frameworks. The 
significant market power of new powerful players was the direct consequence of 
the positions of their predecessors. Moreover, it was the direct consequence of 
the way of their privatization. The agenda of the European reform of the 
industry did not envisage the horizontal separation of these monopolies before 
privatization. Moreover, there was a claim that the single European market will 
allow to benefit from economies of scale, that, according to some opinions, was 
not possible within the borders of one country (Koenig et al., 2002). However, 
the noticed in Section 3 examples of Central and Eastern European countries 
clearly testify against the necessity of such supranational scope of economies of 
scale for the telecom development. Furthermore, new entrants of the new 
“demonopolized” market of Europe were not able to benefit from economies of 
scale and scope 7  due to the regulatory constraints, since the process of 
“demonopolization” occurred bit by bit, service by service.8  It took about 10 
years before all services were placed in the competitive environment. Moreover, 
not only services but even telecommunications infrastructure was not placed in 
the competitive market in the beginning of such kind of “liberalization”, and, 
consequently, potential entrants were not allowed to develop their business 
                                                 
7Results of some researches show that economies of scale played a less significant role in 
telecommunications than economies of scope (Bloch et al., 2001) 
8In 1988 was opened the terminal equipment market, in 1990 market for “non-voice 
services and voice services for closed groups”, in 1994 satellite services, in 1995 Cable 
TV, in 1996 mobile communications and from 1 January 1998 voice telephony services. 
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independently and had to rely on the accessibility of the incumbents’ 
infrastructure and on their capability to get this access. Such slowness of the 
“liberalization” could be easier explained by the willingness to control the 
innovation development of the industry by the interest groups rather than by any 
public needs. 
Competition policies, that intend to promote rivalry in highly 
concentrated industries, pay attention to peculiar industry features and try to 
facilitate competition through the alleviation of the influence of them on entry. 
The significant part of the regulatory efforts is dedicated to the problem of 
monopolistic bottlenecks, such as local loops, that can be considered as essential 
facilities of network infrastructure (De Bijl, 2005). However, it might be argued 
that facilities-based competition is able to reduce the needs for the regulation of 
the bottlenecks (Canoy, De Bijl & Kemp, 2003) and provides more efficient 
outcome of the development of network infrastructure compared to service-
based competition (Yoo, 2014), while the latter has been the main target of the 
European “pro-competition” policy in the industry. Moreover, the problem of 
the bottlenecks can be per se a consequence of regulation and can be solved by 
the implementation of new technologies or new approaches in the development 
of the networks (Trubnikov, 2017). In other words, the existence of 
“monopolistic bottlenecks” is the result of the previous industrial policy, and the 
efforts that aim at the alleviation of the problem rather than to the alteration of 
the industry structure provide advantages to the most powerful actors of the 
market, and, thus, might be considered as an example of government failure. 
4.3. The necessity of integrity and security of networks and services 
This problem can be represented through different approaches in terms of 
market failure. Firstly, supporters of paternalism can argue that people could 
choose services of low quality because they are cheaper, and, thus, there are 
needs for government intervention. Secondly, in case of lack of competition 
nothing forces incumbent to maintain sufficient quality of their services, and, 
therefore, government must solve the competition failure problem. Thirdly, there 
is a problem of information asymmetry. It could be quite plausible that a 
company can sacrifice security or quality issues for profits, hiding the actual 
information about services from its customers, or even worse, a company can 
deliberately neglect important issues for some reasons and provide wrong 
information to customers.  
The paternalistic outlook is a matter of taste and values of a researcher 
and discussion about it can be infinite and futile, but two other justifications for 
the interventions in the market can be the objects of analysis. If the competitive 
environment has not been achieved, then arguments for government control of 
the network integrity and security are quite robust, but it does not explain the 
40 Regulation of Telecommunications: The Choice Between Market and … (p. 29-48) 
 
TRUBNIKOV, D. Regulation of Telecommunications: The Choice Between Market and Regulatory Failures. 
Journal of Law and Regulation, v. 3, n. 1, p. 29-48, May 2017. 
regulation of small players, which try to survive in the presence of powerful 
rivals. Meanwhile, since the information asymmetry plays a significant role in 
the telecommunications business, the activity of even small companies indeed 
could unfairly harm the interests of customers, but this is a problem of provision 
of fair information, rather than a problem of integrity and security. Otherwise, it 
is again the issue from the realm of paternalism. However, the asymmetric 
regulation of telecommunications companies depending on the size of market 
share seems like a reasonable answer to the imperfection of market mechanisms 
in this aspect. Small market participants in order to benefit from the network 
effect of the entire network are forced to adjust their activity to the standards and 
technologies that have been established on the market, while incumbents have 
temptation to prevent weak rivals from these benefits. Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
pointed out this phenomenon in their seminal work dedicated to the analysis of 
network externalities. 
Meanwhile, the drawbacks of the government activity in this field are 
expressed in economic and social issues. Such regulatory efforts increase the 
costs of the roll-out of networks and, thus, decrease the territory that could be 
commercially interesting for the business, and, as a result, contribute to the 
problem of “digital divide”. At the same time, compliance with the rules can 
have pronounced impact on economies of scale, and, thereby, provides cost 
advantages for the big players of the market, contributing to the concentration of 
the market in the hands of big business. Based on the foregoing, we have to 
admit that this area is quite subtle for the regulatory activity. Solution of such 
imperfectness of market mechanisms can easily take the form of over-inclusivity 
and, thus, over-regulation, and lead to the creation of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic markets. 
4.4. The harmonization of networks, associated facilities and services 
through standardization 
It is widely believed that the market also cannot achieve efficiency due to 
inability to coordinate market actors. Using the terms of the described earlier 
approach to the issue of market failure, this problem derives from the 
information asymmetry or incomplete information. It is easy to imagine, that 
without standardization some market actors, due to the lack of information, can 
choose technology, that is not interoperable with the technology that is used by 
other market actors, and, as a result, they will not be able to connect their 
networks or to provide the full range of services. However, the problem of 
incomplete information does not give a full clarification of the issue. The lack of 
standards provides opportunities to lock-in customers on the particular 
technology, and these costumers are not only end-users of telecommunications 
services, but also providers of these services. The entire business of these 
Regulation of Telecommunications: The Choice Between Market and … (p. 29-48) 41 
TRUBNIKOV, D. Regulation of Telecommunications: The Choice Between Market and Regulatory Failures. 
Journal of Law and Regulation, v. 3, n. 1, p. 29-48, May 2017. 
companies and also their ability to adopt new innovative technologies can be 
locked-in on a particular producer of a proprietary standard. The relationship 
between these costumers and the owners of proprietary technology can be also 
considered through the monopolistic problem, because the supplier in this 
situation becomes a single supplier on the market of a particular technology. 
Despite the rationales for government intervention described above, the 
regulation of this field also provides opportunities for government to fail in 
achieving a socially desirable outcome. First of all, it could be a problem of 
QWERTY-effect that locks the industry in a particular technology despite the 
presence of better solutions. A more serious problem is if an adopted technology 
is not suitable for the future development, even if at the moment of adaptation it 
showed sufficient or even better results than alternatives. The fact that among 
the most prevalent standards of Internet access in the western Europe are 
DOCSIS and xDSL, but not FTTx (OECD, 2015), is, possibly, a problem of this 
kind. Yoo (2014), for example, notices that due to the standardization policy of 
the French regulator, former monopolist Orange even in 2010 aimed to increase 
the ADSL coverage to 99% by 2013, while in many eastern European countries 
by that time the significant part of the subscribers had broadband access through 
fiber-optic infrastructure (Rood, 2010; FTTH Council Europe, 2012). The worst 
situation is adaptation of a standard due to the adjustment of regulation to the 
interests of powerful groups at the expense of public interests. The consequences 
of this adaptation is not only lock-in on the inferior technology, but also the 
contribution to the concentration of resources in the industry. 
4.5. Control over companies that have significant market power 
It was one of the first justification of the government presence in the 
economic activity. If industry’s inherited characteristics tilt this industry toward 
monopoly, then Pareto efficiency will not be achieved and, thus, government 
should find ways to move the prices closer to the competitive level. It is 
necessary to notice that in the light of legal systems of developed countries 
monopolies are not illegal per se, but some conduct of companies with 
significant market power may result in antitrust liability. The skeptical view on 
government intervention induced by the market concentration was intensely 
promoted by the Chicago School and has found its significant place in the 
contemporary antitrust policy (Posner, 1979). 
The common arguments of liberal economists are based on the 
assumption that monopoly is formed by market, and, thus, in many cases this 
situation could be considered as a better allocation of resources from the point of 
view of “consumers welfare”, but the broader view on the problem of 
“government failure” allows to look at the picture from another viewpoint. 
Significant market power of telecommunications companies can be the direct 
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consequence of the set of previous decisions of policymakers, and it even does 
not matter whether the reason of these interventions was market failure, rent-
seeking, cronyism or corruption. Therefore, if the positions of major players are 
the result of regulation, then it must be difficult to justify a passive role of the 
regulator in such cases of competition failure even from the liberal viewpoints. 
Monopolies of the ICT industry in general, and monopolies of 
telecommunications in particular, can be dangerous, not only in the sense of 
threats to “consumers’ welfare”, but also from social and political perspectives. 
Since the information and communication industry is the driving force of the 
modern economy, it is possible to infer that the concentration of power in the 
industry leads to the concentration of wealth in the hands of the most powerful 
players of this field. Meanwhile, it is a widespread view in the areas of 
economics and social sciences that concentration of wealth can threaten our 
freedom and democratic principles of modern society (Acemoglu et al., 2013; 
Murphy, 2015). The increasing inequality can lead to the growth of “extractive 
institutions” that served the interests of ruling classes (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012) and, eventually, can “have a negative effect on the rule of law ... and 
ambiguous effects on regulation” (Murphy, 2015). This situation, possibly, 
requires revision of the purposes of competition law and elaboration of new 
methods and approaches in this area. 
4.6. The social significance of telecommunications services 
The unchallenged importance of ICT for the modern world gives birth to 
ideas that significantly affect the regulatory policy of this field. Even in the 
realm of human rights nowadays we can find the idea that human beings have a 
right to Internet access and that they should not be discriminated in this right.9 
The policymakers of many countries eagerly try to incorporate this idea into the 
efforts of subsidization of the development of telecom infrastructure. However, 
even the presence of the problem of digital divide in the second decade of the 
XXI century in the developed parts of the world is able to raise reasonable 
questions about the real sources of this issue. 
Meanwhile, “direct subsidy of money” according to Stigler (1971) is “the 
most obvious contribution that a group may seek of the government”. The 
shortage of competition increases deadweight loss and expresses in the shortage 
of supply in the market. As we analyzed above, the shortage of competition can 
be not only a result of the government failings in the solution of the task of 
promotion of rivalry, but also the consequence of regulatory policy in other 
                                                 
9 One of Wikipedia articles is even dedicated to this issue 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_Internet_access. 
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fields, such as radio spectrum distribution or even necessity to maintain 
harmonization, integrity and security of networks. The ideas that freeing of 
some parts of radio spectrum would allow to solve the problem of provision of 
telecommunications services in rural areas can be met in academic literature in 
the beginning of the 2000s (Compaine, 2003; Wanichkorn & Sirbu, 2002), but 
instead, “emphasis on bringing broadband to low density areas continues to look 
at the cost of “wiring” (Compaine, 2003). 
Another idea that prevails in the regulatory efforts in this aspect is the 
equalization of inhabitants of urban and rural areas. 10  Numerous “digital 
agenda” of various countries includes not only the necessity of provisioning the 
access to modern information services, but also impose minimal requirements to 
these services (OECD, 2015), that can be understood as a mechanism of “control 
over entry”. Indeed, if the problem of Internet access in some particular village 
can be solved with implementation of a particular radio technology, the 
requirements of provision of speeds equal or over, for example, 30 or 100 Mbit/s 
(OECD 2015) can deter alternative players to enter the market. Moreover, it is 
even not clear that broadband access with different characteristics can be 
considered as a part of the problem of digital divide. It can also be argued that 
nowadays basic telecommunications services are comparatively cheap and they 
could be even cheaper if the market would be more competitive, while direct 
public investments in the development of the industry create advantages for 
those who get it, and, thus, negatively affect rivalry. 
Digital divide is not the only idea that has been embraced by the 
regulation of ICT industry in general and telecommunications particularly. 
There are also important issues of freedom, privacy, security, child protection 
and so on, and there are no doubts that all of these problems are of paramount 
significance for the modern society, but the question here is the appropriate 
balance between market mechanisms and regulation. The results of regulatory 
failings in these subtle aspects could be even more destructive than merely 
creation of advantageous conditions for some companies in the industries of the 
XX century. It is also possible to admit that at least some of these problems are 
mainly the consequence of regulation, and could be better solved by the market, 
while regulatory activity in this field contributes to the processes of 
monopolization, and, eventually, will aggravate other issues such as freedom, 
privacy and inequality. 
                                                 
10The interesting fact is that even the idea of the “universal service” per se “was a stun-
ning strategic action" of the president of AT&T Theodore Vail that allowed the company 
to gain the monopoly in the United States by means of the government protection of the 
business of AT&T from competition (Grove, 2003). 
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5. Conclusion 
The given analysis of the main regulatory frameworks through the 
positions of the concept of market failure with an eye to the interests of the main 
market players in telecommunications industry allows to draw the following 
conclusions: 
First of all, the current way of development of the telecommunications 
industry is the result of previous policy decisions in this field, and the 
dominance of supranational companies in the world market can be considered as 
the consequence of regulatory efforts rather than inherited industry’s 
characteristics. The prevalence of the idea of the importance of “economies of 
scale” in telecommunications for the development of the new economy has 
contributed to the processes of privatization that occurred during the last 
decades and has allowed transnational giants to take control over the former 
national monopolies, forming the global oligopolistic market. 
Secondly, even “privatization” and “liberalization” processes in 
telecommunications do not allow to conclude that the “public interests based” 
approach dominates in the regulatory policy. About any aspect of regulation 
allows to find ways to provide opportunities for some groups of the industry and 
stifle activity of others. Self-interested policymakers have favorable 
opportunities to explain their decisions through the needs of maintenance of the 
digital economy, solution of social problems, interests of national defense or 
harmonization of networks. 
Thirdly, telecommunications industry is not necessarily the business of 
big corporations that try to convince the policymakers that rivalry in this area 
can endanger “the long-term health of the ... digital economy” (Vodafone, 
2015). This industry is able to give opportunities for small enterprises to be 
active in the market and to enable consumers to benefit from innovative activity 
of these companies, for whom only flexibility and innovations provide 
possibilities to survive in the competitive environment. 
Fourthly, despite the seeming necessity to maintain the integrity, security 
and harmonization of networks, as well as to provide solution for other 
important aspects, the reasons to extend regulation in the activity of alternative 
companies are very doubtful. The alternative companies are forced to maintain 
integrity and harmonization due to the presence of market forces. In order to 
benefit from the network effect of the entire network, rather than limit this 
benefit by the scope of their private networks, they are forced to harmonize their 
networks with facilities of other market participants, and this is one of those 
cases where market mechanisms are able to work better than government 
intervention. However, it does not exclude the necessity to regulate the activity 
of incumbents and weaken their positions in the market in order to remedy the 
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competition failure, that, as we have seen above, could be not only the result of 
the market imperfection, but also the consequence of regulatory activity. 
Finally, the problem of “digital divide” can be considered as an example 
of deadweight loss caused by government intervention in the market. The high 
cost of compliance moves the supply curve and, thus, decreases the quantity of 
the goods in the market. However, it does not mean that the total absence of 
regulation could provide better results. Inability of government to effectively 
solve the problem of externalities, like in case with radio frequencies 
distribution, hampers the entrance of small business in this field and, thus, 
contribute to the undersupply in the market. 
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